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Blue Skies Ahead: Auction Rate
Securities and the Need for a
Private Right of Action for New
York Investors
Stephanie Myers
The United States‘ failing economy is in the news every
day. In response to the economic disaster looming on the
horizon, the United States government passed a bailout plan.
The financial industry bears partial blame for the crisis, due in
part to the risky investments that the firms had backed and
marketed to investors. Investments such as Auction Rate
Securities (―ARS‖) are a prime example, as the market for ARS
is upwards of $330 billion and it became illiquid as of February
2008.1 A lay-investor has difficulty understanding this type of
investment; some might even say that the brokers who sold
these securities did not fully understand ARS and the way they
performed in the market.
This Comment discusses ARS and the settlements that
securities regulators have reached with various brokerage
firms in the face of allegations that they misrepresented the
risks associated with ARS to investors. The settlements will
return to liquidity the ARS holdings of tens of thousands of
customers. However, not all customers are covered by the
settlements; those who are not must resort to filing a lawsuit or
arbitration claim against their brokers and brokerage firms to
recover their illiquid investments. For reasons explained
below, ARS investors will be hard-pressed to bring a successful

Pace University School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2010. I would like to
thank Professor Jill Gross both for her insight into this topic and for her
continued support and encouragement in all of my endeavors.
1. See Bank of America in Auction-Rate Securities Settlement,
PHILADELPHIA
BUS.
J.,
Sept.
10,
2008,
available
at
http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2008/09/08/daily22.html. See
also Melanie Cherdack & Daniel A. Ball, Auction Rate Securities: The New
Frontier, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 335 (2008), available at WL1686 PLI/Corp335.
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claim under federal securities laws and must therefore rely on
state securities laws.
Due to the differing state securities laws, investors in some
states will likely be able to recover their investments, while
investors in New York will probably not. This is due to New
York‘s unique Martin Act2 and the fact that New York
investors must rely on common law causes of action as the
basis for their suits.3 Is it fair that New York investors are at
such an extreme disadvantage simply because the New York
State legislature has failed to grant investors a private right of
action? This Comment‘s position is that it is unfair; and
accordingly, seeks to urge the Legislature to adopt a version of
the Uniform Securities Act of 2002.4 A hypothetical example of
an entirely unsophisticated investor, Sarah, a New York
resident who inherited a substantial sum of money from a
family member and is convinced by a broker to invest the
money in ARS, demonstrates the need for such a statute. If
Sarah were a resident of almost any other state instead of New
York, she would likely recover her investment. However, as a
resident of New York, she will presumably have little recourse.
I. Auction Rate Securities
A. Background5
―Auction-rate securities are variable-interest rate, longterm securities that were marketed to individual, retail
investors and institutional investors as cash equivalents by
many of Wall Street‘s leading financial institutions.‖6 Cash
equivalents are investments many consider to be ―liquid,‖
2.
3.
4.
5.

See generally N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1996).
See discussion infra Part III(A).
See generally UNIF. SEC. ACT (2002).
See generally STEPHANIE LEE, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, AUCTIONRATE SECURITIES: BIDDER‘S REMORSE? A PRIMER 10 (2008), available at
http://www.mmc.com/knowledgecenter/NERA_PUB_Auction_Rate_Securities.
pdf (―The first ARS was registered by American Express in July 1984. The
instrument was conceived by Ronald Gallatin, managing director of new
product development in the Lehman Brothers Unit of Shearson
Lehman/American Express.‖).
6. Sean T. Seelinger, Auction-Rate Securities: A Fast & Furious Fall, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 287, 287 (2009).
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meaning investors may sell them very easily.7 Investors were
tempted by ARS because the securities typically paid a higher
yield than other ―liquid‖ investments.8
There generally are two types of ARS, bonds with
long-term maturities (20 to 30 years) and
preferred shares with a cash dividend. Both the
interest on the bonds and the dividend on the
preferred shares are variable based on rates that
are set through auctions for a specified short
term usually measured in days—7, 14, 28, or 35.9
B. Dutch Auctions
Holders of ARS have several choices before each auction:
investors can choose to hold their current position at a specified
rate, sell their ARS, or hold their ARS at the newest prevailing
rate established at auction.10 The issuers of the ARS hold
dutch auctions, which are:
[O]pen bidding process[es] in which the issuers
announce[ ] [their] intention[s] to offer a fixed
quantity of shares and solicit[ ] bids from
investors who are interested in participating.
Each potential investor submits a bid specifying
how many shares he or she is willing to buy and
at what price, and these bids become irrevocable
and binding at the close of the bidding period.11

7. See The SEC’s Recent Actions With Respect to Auction Rate Securities:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services., 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement,
SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts091808lct.htm
[hereinafter The SEC’s Recent Actions]. See also Eric Dash & Louise Story, 2
Banks Buying Back Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at C1.
8. Aaron Pressman, Auction-Rate Securities: How to Get Unstuck, BUS.
WK., June 2, 2008, at 76.
9. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Auction Rate Securities:
What
Happens
When
Auctions
Fail,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/P038207
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
10. Id.
11. Lucas C. Townsend, Comment, Can Wall Street’s “Global Resolution”

3

1112

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

The issuer begins by accepting the bids ―with the lowest
interest or dividend rate . . . first, followed by successively
higher bids until all the securities available for auction are
sold.‖12 The last bid determines the ―‗clearing rate,‘ . . . [which
is the rate that will apply] to all [of] the ARS until the next
auction.‖13 The auction will fail if there are not enough bids to
purchase all of the ARS for sale.14
C. Failing Auctions
ARS auctions began failing in February, 2008.15 Prior to
the failed auctions, ―[t]o maintain liquidity, financial
institutions bid on their own securities, creating a false sense
of demand in the minds of investors.‖16 Once the crux of the
credit crisis hit, however, the demand for ARS declined and the
firms no longer had sufficient capital to provide supporting
bids.17 Without the brokerage firms‘ bids, the auctions began
to fail because there were not enough buyers to purchase all of
the ARS that were up for sale at each auction.18

Prevent Spinning? A Critical Evaluation of Current Alternatives, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1121, 1163 (2004).
12. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. During the week of February 15, 2008, almost 1,000 of the ARS
failed. Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, New Trouble in Auction-Rate
Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C6. On February 22, 2008, 258 out of
386, or 67%, of auctions failed. Jeremy R. Cooke, Florida Schools, California
Convert
Auction-Rate
Debt,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Feb.
22,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=awCJRyi5ngcQ&re
fer=us. This is an overwhelming figure considering the fact that only fortyfour auctions had ever failed between the advent of ARS in 1984 and the end
of 2007. Id.
16. See Seelinger, supra note 6, at 288. See generally Martin Z. Braun &
William Selway, UBS Won't Support Failing Auction-Rate Securities,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Feb.
14,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=
aa0bS7QZqvlk.
17. See Braun & Selway, supra note 16. See also Seelinger, supra note
6, at 295-98 (explaining in detail the economic events leading up to the failed
auctions).
18. See Amod Choudhary, Auction-Rate Securities = Auction Risky
Securities, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 23, 30-31 (2009).
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When an auction fails, investors do not ―lose‖ their
investments. The security is simply illiquid, meaning that the
money is still invested in the bond or preferred share, but that
the investor cannot access it.19 As brokers often marketed the
ARS as liquid, many investors counted on being able to pull out
of the market at any time when they needed the invested
money for other purposes.20 When auctions fail, investors
endure financial hardship because their invested money is not
available for their use.21 Investors have several options when
faced with an illiquid ARS: they may hold until there is a
successful auction, borrow money from the firm using the ARS
as collateral, sell the security at a loss on a secondary market
(if one is available), or wait for the investment to mature—
which, in the case of a 20-30 year bond, is an extreme burden
on the investor.22
None of the above alternatives are ideal for the average
investor. Should the investor choose to wait until a successful
auction, his or her money will be unavailable and in the market
for an unspecified amount of time. While the market is
illiquid, however, the investor does continue to receive interest
at the highest ―fail rate.‖23 Borrowing money from the firm is
also unadvisable. While the loan may give the investor a
temporary supply of cash, some loans charge interest rates that
are higher than the yield the investor would receive on the
actual ARS.24 Selling on a secondary market could cause the
investor to lose a large portion of the investment, as the
illiquidity of the market makes it highly unlikely that buyers
would be willing to pay a fair value.25 Firms marketed ARS to
investors as a highly liquid investment, and therefore, most

19. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.
20. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7.
21. Id.
22. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. Note that for
customers who can afford to hold an illiquid investment, many ARS are a
great investment because the fail rates are soaring due to the failed auctions.
See Anderson & Bajaj, supra note 15.
23. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. A fail rate is
―an interest rate or dividend set above market rates [that the investor
continues to receive] for the next holding period—up to any maximum
disclosed in the offering documents.‖ Id.
24. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.
25. Id.
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investors are unable to wait twenty to thirty years, until the
security matures in order to have access to their invested
funds.
When the $330 billion ARS market froze and became
illiquid in early 2008 due to failed auctions, investor
complaints began flooding into federal securities regulators
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (―FINRA‖)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), as well
as to state securities regulators.26 Investors claimed that the
brokerage firms who sold the ARS did not explain the liquidity
and investment risks associated with the product.27 Regulators
claimed that ―in late 2007 and early 2008, the firms knew that
the ARS market was deteriorating, causing the firms to have to
purchase additional inventory to prevent failed auctions.‖28
The firms, however, continued to market ARS to customers,
allegedly knowing that they were not going to have sufficient
capital in the long-term to continue to provide supporting
bids.29 Whether or not the firms and individual brokers knew
of the repercussions that would follow a cessation of supplying
supporting bids is a question that has yet to be affirmatively
answered.
II. ARS Settlements
A. Results of Regulatory Authorities
Due to the large number of ARS investor complaints
reported to securities regulators, many industry regulators and
enforcement agencies began investigating the ARS markets
26. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7. See also Press Release, Fin.
Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Announces Agreements in Principle With
Five Firms to Settle Auction Rate Securities Violations (Sept. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P117019.
27. See Seelinger, supra note 6, at 288 (explaining that brokers failed to
disclose to investors that the issuing firms were supplying supporting bids at
auction, and that without those bids the auctions would likely fail and the
markets would be in jeopardy). See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n,
SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements With Citigroup and UBS, Providing Nearly
$30 Billion in Liquidity to Investors (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290.htm.
28. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
29. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7.
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and the firms‘ roles in the markets‘ illiquidities. After these
investigations, the SEC and some state securities regulators
filed complaints in federal district courts against several large
firms.30 The allegations related first to the failure of the firms
to adequately explain the risks associated with ARS to
investors, and second, to the firms‘ continued selling of ARS to
investors while knowing that the market was likely to fail if
the firms discontinued supplying supporting bids.31 Several
large firms have agreed to settle these charges.
As of
December 2008, ―[t]he SEC ha[d] announced final ARS
settlements with Citigroup Global Markets, UBS Financial
Services and UBS Securities, while FINRA ha[d] reached final
settlements with WaMu Investments and First Southwest
Company.32 In 2009, the SEC reached final ARS settlements
with: Bank of America, RBC, Deutsche Bank and Wachovia.33
The settlements and agreements vary in principle, but the
main aspects of each are similar, with each firm neither
denying nor admitting liability.
B. Citigroup Global Markets Settlement With SEC
This Comment will focus on Citigroup‘s (―Citi‖) final
settlement as an example.34
The settlement provides
approximately $7.5 billion in liquidity to Citi customers.35 ―Citi
30. See, e.g., State Sues Schwab Over Auction-Rate Securities, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at B6.
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Provides
Details on Special Arbitration Procedures For ARS Consequential Damages
(Dec.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P117557. See also Press
Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 26.
33. The Securities and Exchange Commission website provides links to
access the complaints and consents pertaining to the ARS settlement it
reached with each company. See Securities and Exchange Commission,
Auction Rate Securities, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ars.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2010).
34. Citi was the first to settle and its agreement has served as a model
for other companies. However, each firm‘s agreement is likely to be slightly
different in detail. Actual settlements are of course subject to court approval.
See Consent Decree, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n v. Citigroup Global Mkts., No. 08
Civ.
10753,
(S.D.N.Y.
Dec.
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290-citiconsent.pdf.
35. See id. See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Citigroup
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will offer to purchase ARS at par from individuals, charities,
and small businesses that purchased those ARS from Citi, even
if those customers moved their accounts.‖36 Eligible customers
are those who purchased ARS through Citi on or before
February 12, 2008, and held those securities in a Citi account
on February 12, 2008.37 The Citi customers who took out a
loan to satisfy their cash needs will be reimbursed for the
interest expense that they were forced to pay for the loan, less
what interest they collected from the underlying ARS.38 ARS
customers who sold their holdings on a secondary market at a
loss will be reimbursed for ―the difference between par and the
price at which the Eligible Customer sold the auction rate
securities, plus reasonable interest thereon.‖39 Citi is also
required to find liquidity solutions for other customers whom it
will not make offers to repurchase the ARS.40 Citi is not
allowed to make its own ARS investments liquid before it does
Agrees in Principle to Auction Rate Securities Settlement (Aug. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-168.htm. The UBS
settlement provided approximately $22.7 billion in liquidity to eligible
customers who purchased ARS through UBS. Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm‘n, supra note 27.
The following is a list of the firms that have reached agreements in
principle with the SEC and the amount of ARS they have agreed to buy back
from their customers: Bank of America, $4.5 billion, see Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm‘n, Bank of America Agrees in Principle to ARS Settlement (Oct.
8, 2008), available at http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-247.htm;
RBC, $800 million, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC Division of
Enforcement Announces ARS Settlement in Principle with RBC Capital
Markets,
Inc.
(Oct.
8,
2008),
available
at
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-246.htm; Merrill Lynch, $1.5
billion, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC Enforcement Division
Announces Preliminary Settlement with Merrill Lynch to Help Auction Rate
Securities
Investors
(Aug.
22,
2008),
available
at
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-181.htm; Wachovia, $9 billion, see
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Wachovia Agrees to Preliminary
Auction Rate Securities Settlement that Would Offer Approximately $9
Billion
to
Investors
(Aug.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-176.htm.
36. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
37. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 2. See also Morgan Stanley Smith
Barney, Auction Rate Securities, Practices and Procedures of Citigroup
Global
Markets
Inc.,
https://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/fixed_income/auction_rate_s
ecurities/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
38. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 8-9.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
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so for its customers.41
Some ARS investors turned to the secondary market when
the auctions began to fail. The ARS sold for a price lower than
par value, resulting in a loss to the investor.42 Citi is required
to reimburse those eligible customers for the difference
between the par value of the ARS and the value the customer
actually sold it for.43 When the market froze, many brokerage
firms began to allow their customers to borrow cash on margin
to make up for their illiquid investments.44 However, the
interest rate on those loans may have been higher than the
rate of return on the underlying ARS.45
Citi now will
reimburse its customers for the amount of the interest
payments that exceeded the return on the ARS investment.46
However, the settlement does not require Citi to reimburse
customers for any consequential damages47 they may have
suffered while their investment was illiquid.48
C. FINRA’s Special Arbitration Procedures
When an investor wishes to dispute an action taken by his
or her brokerage firm, the investor may file a lawsuit or an
arbitration claim to resolve the discrepancy. FINRA has
announced special arbitration procedures for customers
covered by the ARS settlements that will allow those customers
to pursue claims for consequential damages.49 Under the
special procedures, the investor has the option to file for any
41. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 9-10. See also Press Release, Sec.
& Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
42. Darrell Preston, Banks Say Auction-Rate Investors Can’t Have
Money,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
June
6,
2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aWaReGVrnTHk.
See also Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.
43. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 9. See also Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
44. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.
45. See id.
46. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 8-9. See also Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
47. Consequential damages are those ―[l]osses that do not flow directly
and immediately from an injurious act but that result indirectly from the
act.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (8th ed. 2004).
48. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 10-11.
49. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32.

9

1118

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

opportunity costs he or she suffered as a result of the market
becoming illiquid.50 There are several benefits to an investor
who chooses to file under the special procedures. The greatest
advantage is that the ―firms cannot contest liability related to
the illiquidity of ARS holdings . . . including any claims of
misrepresentations or omissions by the firm‘s sales agents.‖51
The firms also may not defend against the consequential
damages claim by invoking the customer‘s decision to refuse
the loan that the firm offered him or her prior to the
settlement.52 The firms are responsible for paying all fees
associated with the filing of a claim, such as filing fees and
hearing session fees.53 In addition, the forum will appoint one
arbitrator to hear consequential damage claims which demand
less than one million dollars.54 Once the investor proceeds
under the special arbitration procedures, he or she is barred
from pursuing a claim for further relief in another forum.55 If
the investor would like to recover punitive or other damages,
he or she may choose to file a claim under the standard
arbitration procedures.56
D. Investors Not Covered by Settlements
While the settlements and special arbitration procedures
will remedy the harm suffered by some ARS investors,
―investors that bought from medium-size and online
brokerages, a.k.a ‗downstream sellers‘ in the secondary market,
and those that bought structured auction rate notes, are among
the investors not covered in the regulator‘s settlement.‖57
Regulators only achieved settlements with the largest, most
well-known ARS-issuing firms, while many investors
50. Id. An opportunity cost is ―[t]he costs of acquiring an asset
measured by the value of an alternative investment that is forgone.‖ BLACK‘S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 295.
51. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32.
52. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 11.
53. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32.
54. See id.
55. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 11.
56. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32.
57. Structured Auction Rate Notes, Downstream Sellers, Consequential
Damages, Oh My!, http://www.zamansky.com/blog/2008/09/structuredauction-rate-notes.html (Sept. 5, 2008, 12:36 EST).
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purchased ARS from smaller brokerage firms that are not
being pushed by regulators to settle.58 These smaller firms
defend their selling of ARS by declaring that the issuing firms
never explained the risks to the brokers who were actually
selling ARS.59 The ―downstream‖ sellers claim they did not
know that the issuing firms were controlling the market by
providing supporting bids.60 Some ARS customer lawyers
claim that these sellers either knew or purposely shielded
themselves from discovering the actual risks associated with
ARS.61 It is not yet clear whether the industry regulators will
hold downstream sellers responsible for their role in customer
purchases of ARS.62
Large institutional and corporate investors are also not
covered in the ARS settlements.63 With respect to these
customers, Citi is only required to ―use its best efforts to
provide liquidity solutions for institutional and other
customers.‖64 It is questionable whether the settlements will
cover other groups of investors, such as those who moved their
ARS accounts between two large firms that settled during the
time period that the settlements state the person must have
owned the ARS with the firm.65 For example, a customer who
purchased the ARS from one broker, but then moved her

58. Liz Rappaport & Shefali Anand, “DownStream” Sellers of AuctionRate Securities Balk at Prospect of Buybacks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2008, at
C3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Lavonne Kuykendall, Auction-Rate Securities Buy-Back Could Help
Bond
Insurers,
MARKETWATCH.COM.,
Aug.
14,
2008,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/auction-rate-securities-buy-backscould-help/story.aspx?guid={00AC3D5A-8CCB-47B3-B1CD5B34E1109297}&dist=TQP_Mod_mktwN (―Citi said it will not buy back
securities owned by larger institutional clients, but will work with the
securities' issuers and others to provide ‗liquidity solutions‘ for other
institutional investor clients.‖).
64. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27.
65. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Investors Who Can’t Come in From the
Cold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at BU1 (discussing an example where a
woman who moved her ARS from UBS to Citi/Smith Barney did not qualify
under either company‘s settlement eligibility requirements because
regulators chose the ownership dates based upon when the regulators
determined that the firm knew of the failing auctions).
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account to Citi, is not an eligible customer under Citi‘s
settlement.66 These investors must contact the firms through
which they purchased the ARS to determine if the firms are
willing to settle or repurchase the ARS.67
E. Repercussions for Those Not Covered
Typically, brokerage firm contracts require their customers
to forego their right to file a claim in court and specify that any
dispute must be resolved by arbitration in a dedicated forum,
such as FINRA.68 Customers who are not eligible under the
ARS settlements do not receive the benefit of FINRA‘s special
arbitration procedures.69 This means that these investors‘ only
recourse is to pursue relief under the standard FINRA
arbitration rules, which puts investors at a disadvantage when
compared with the special arbitration procedures. First, in a
standard arbitration, the brokerage firms may contest liability
as to the alleged misrepresentations of ARS risks, as well as
the illiquidity of the investors‘ ARS holdings.70 Second, the
investor is required to pay all costs of filing a claim, including
but not limited to, filing fees and hearing session fees.71
Arbitration costs may deter some investors from filing a claim,
as the costs may be very high depending upon the amount of
the claim and the number of arbitrators assigned to hear it.
Once in arbitration, the investor may either assert a
violation of federal or state law as a basis for the cause of
action. ARS investors have a potential federal claim against
their brokerage firms or their individual brokers: investors can
assert a violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

66. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, supra note 37.
67. Id.
68. Pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements became the
norm in the securities world after the Supreme Court decided, in Shearson v.
McMahon, that the Securities Exchange Act was subject to enforcement in
arbitration. Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
69. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32.
70. Id.
71. See FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER
DISPUTES,
Rule
12900(a)(1)
(2007),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element
_id=4188.
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Act of 1934,72 or a violation of the rules that implement the
statute.73 Typically the two are alleged together as a Section
10(b) / Rule 10b-5 cause of action. The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 makes it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . .
. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.74
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, . . . (a) To
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit

72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, tit. I, § 10, 48
Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
73. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2009). Although similar in language to Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see § 10, 48 Stat. at 891, lower federal courts
are split as to whether or not there is an implied private right of action for
violations of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No.
73-22, tit. I, § 17, 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(2006)). The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue. For
a thorough examination of the legislative history surrounding the Acts, as
well as an argument as to why there is no private right of action, see CPC
Int‘l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987). But see, e.g.,
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that a private cause of action does exist under
section 17(a)). See also Choudhary, supra note 18, at 35-44 (examining
potential federal causes of action for ARS investors).
74. 48 Stat. at 891.
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upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.75
Neither the statute nor the rule expressly grants investors
a private right of action for fraudulent or deceptive practices,
yet the courts have implied one.76 The elements for a violation
of either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 are: ―(1) a material
misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter . . . ; (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance .
. . ; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‗loss causation,‘ i.e., a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the
loss.‖77 Because the courts have implied a private right of
action, they strictly require proof of scienter, or intent.78 An
allegation of negligence will not support a claim for a violation
of the federal securities acts or rules.79
The possible federal claims are inadequate for ARS
investors because the investor will have difficulty proving that
the brokerage firm or the individual broker had the intent to
defraud investors, or to misrepresent (or omit) necessary facts
to enable the investor to make a sound investment decision.
The element of intent is difficult to prove, especially in the case
of ARS, where many brokers claim that even they were not
aware of the risks associated with ARS. It is improbable that
in such circumstances an investor would be able to prove the
necessary element of intent, and therefore the investor will
likely be unsuccessful with his or her federal claim.
An ARS investor who proceeds to arbitration with an
allegation against his or her broker for a violation of either the
federal securities statute, or rule, will also need to prove the
element of intent. If the broker can establish that he or she did
not fully understand the ARS market, then he or she was at
most negligent in not providing the investor with sufficient
investment advice regarding the risks associated with ARS. A
finding of negligence will not support a claimant‘s allegation of
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
76. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(examining the legislative history of federal securities legislation).
77. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)
(internal citations and emphasis omitted).
78. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
79. Id. at 214.
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a violation of federal securities laws and rules, as sciencter, or
intent, is a necessary element. In the next section, this
Comment will address state law that could govern such a
claim.
III. State Securities Laws
State securities laws, commonly referred to as blue sky
laws, vary from state to state.80 The Uniform Securities Act
(―USA‖), with the most recent version enacted in 2002, has
helped to reduce the variations between states by providing a
suggested statutory framework.81 Even among the states that
have adopted the language of the USA, however, state courts
continue to apply and interpret the statutes differently.82
State securities laws, regardless of the version, ―share
certain features in their approach to prevent sales agents from
promising unrealistic returns and misinforming investors
about the investment risks.‖83 Most states require the security
itself, the issuer, and all brokers to be registered in the state in
which the securities are being offered for sale.84 The state
securities acts also contain ―antifraud provisions that create
liability for any fraudulent statements or failure to disclose
information as required.‖85 To demonstrate the potentially
devastating effects that differing state blue sky laws have on
possible investor claims, the following sections will compare the
applicable New York law with that of Missouri.

80. The origin of the term ―blue sky‖ is unknown. The first reference to
the term was in a Supreme Court opinion written by Justice McKenna.
Justice McKenna, ―us[ing] the language of a cited [though unnamed] case,‖
wrote that the phrase ―blue sky‖ refers to ―speculative schemes which have no
more basis than so many feet of ‗blue sky.‘‖ Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
81. See generally UNIF. SEC. ACT (2002).
82. See Blue Sky Law, Cornell University Law School Legal Information
Institute, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/blue_sky_law (last visited Feb. 10,
2010).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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A. New York’s Martin Act
New York has not adopted the USA, but instead has its
own securities laws that are contained in the Martin Act
(―Act‖).86 The Act contains the usual provisions found in other
state blue sky laws regarding the registration of brokers,
dealers, salesmen, and securities.87 The difference between
New York‘s securities laws and those of other states lies in the
provisions of the Act that deal with fraudulent sales practices
and deception by brokerage firms and brokers.88 ―The Attorney
General is vested with the exclusive authority to enforce the
Martin Act, and is granted various investigatory, regulatory,
and remedial powers aimed at detecting, preventing, and
The Attorney
stopping fraudulent securities practices.‖89
General is not required to ―allege or prove either scienter or
intentional fraud to establish liability for fraudulent practices
under the Martin Act‖90 Individual investors, however, do not
have the same advantages.

86. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1996).
87. Id. § 359-e.
88. Id. § 352-c.
1. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person,
partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or
any agent or employee thereof, to use or employ any of the
following acts or practices: (a) Any fraud, deception,
concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or
pretended purchase or sale; (b) Any promise or
representation as to the future which is beyond reasonable
expectation or unwarranted by existing circumstances; (c)
Any representation or statement which is false, where the
person who made such representation or statement: (i)
knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort could have
known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to
ascertain the truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge
concerning the representation or statement made . . . .
Id.
89. Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., 862 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div.
2008). See also § 352-d.
90. Caboara, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 538. See also Martin Act Does Not
Preclude Common Law Fraud Claim, N.Y. LEGAL UPDATE, Oct. 18, 2007,
http://www.nylegalupdate.com/2007/10/martin-act-does.html.
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1. New York Courts‘ Interpretation of the Martin Act
The New York Court of Appeals held in CPC International,
Inc. v. McKesson Corp. that there is no implied private right of
action under the Martin Act.91 ―In all the other States, except
one, the Legislature has expressly recognized a private civil
action for violations of the . . . [state‘s securities fraud]
provision[s].‖92 The Court held that an implied private right of
action would be against the original purpose of the Act,
reasoning that ―the legislative scheme underlying the Martin
Act . . . was to create a statutory mechanism in which the
Attorney-General would have broad regulatory and remedial
powers to prevent fraudulent securities practices by
investigating and intervening at the first indication of possible
securities fraud on the public . . . .‖93 However, an investor is
not precluded from basing a claim on common law fraud simply
because ―the alleged fraudulent conduct is such that the
Attorney General would be authorized to bring an action
against the defendant under the Martin Act.‖94 ―[P]rivate
causes of action sounding in common-law fraud and breach of
contract may rest upon the same facts that would support a
Martin Act violation as long as they are sufficient to satisfy
traditional rules of pleading and proof.‖95

2. Possible Avenues of Recourse: A Difficult Task
A blue sky law in almost any other state would give the
ARS investor a private right of action against his or her
broker.96 Instead, New York investors must rely on common
law causes of action such as fraud, misrepresentation, etc. as

91. 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987).
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 119.
94. Kramer v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd., 844 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (App.
Div. 2007), appeal withdrawn, 896 N.E.2d 96 (N.Y. 2008).
95. Caboara, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
96. ―[A] statutory cause of action would be consistent with the blue sky
laws of the other States which, except for Rhode Island, all expressly provide
for some form of civil liability.‖ CPC Int’l, 514 N.E.2d at 120.
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bases for their claims.
a. Common Law Fraud
There are five elements that an investor must prove to
establish fraud in New York: ―1) [r]epresentations; 2) [f]alsity;
3) [s]cienter (an intent to make misrepresentations, or reckless
disregard in making it without knowledge); 4) [d]eception of the
party to whom made; and 5) [i]njury due to justified reliance on
The statute of limitations for
the misrepresentation.‖97
common law fraud is ―the greater of six years from the date the
cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff
or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the
fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.‖98
As evident by the fraud elements listed above, the investor
must prove the element of scienter to prevail. This puts an
investor at a tremendous disadvantage because proving that a
broker intended to defraud a customer through the sale of
securities is difficult. In fact, the CPC Court encouraged the
New York State Legislature to ―consider the merits of a
statutorily expressed cause of action . . . [and to] add a remedy
for defrauded investors in those cases where none exists in
common-law fraud.‖99

b. Negligent Misrepresentation
It is possible that an investor could base his or her claim
on negligent misrepresentation, and argue that the broker was
―[C]areless[ ] in imparting words upon which
others were expected to rely and upon which they

97. J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS,
ATTORNEYS, AND INVESTORS 185 (1994).
98. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2003).
99. CPC Int’l, 514 N.E.2d at 119-20. Judge Hancock, who drafted the
majority opinion, actually disagreed with the rest of the majority in regard to
what the purpose of the Martin Act was. Hancock believed that the broader
purpose of the Act was to deter fraudulent securities practices, which in turn
would be consistent with implying a private cause of action. Id.
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did act or failed to act to their damage,‖ and the
author must express the information ―directly,
with knowledge or notice that it will be acted
upon, to one to whom the author is bound by
some relation of duty . . . to act with care if he
acts at all.‖100
As discussed below, a New York resident, as compared to a
resident of a state that has adopted a blue sky law that
provides a private right of action, will have much more
difficulty prevailing in a law suit or arbitration proceeding
based upon a common law cause of action. It is unclear why
the New York legislature has taken this position. With
surprisingly little written on this topic, one may only presume
that it is the result of an intense lobby from Wall Street. This
Comment‘s position is that it is not fair to have such an
extreme disadvantage simply because one resides in the state
where the financial markets of the world operate.
B. Missouri Securities Act of 2003101
Missouri‘s blue sky laws, contained in the Missouri
Securities Act of 2003 (―MSA‖), are premised upon the Uniform
Securities Act of 2002. Missouri state courts have stated that
the purpose of the Act is to protect investors.102 ―Fulfillment of
that statutory purpose ‗embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.‘‖103

100. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1007 n.99
(2002) (quoting White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977)). The
New York Court of Appeals has not yet answered the question of whether an
investor may claim negligent misrepresentation when faced with a violation
of the Martin Act. See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing cases).
101. This Comment relies on Missouri as the comparison state because it
was the first state to adopt the Uniform Securities Act of 2002. MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 409.1-101 to 409.7-703 (West 2009).
102. State v. Reber, 977 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
103. Id. (citing Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., 479 S.W.2d 491, 499
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972)).
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1. Private Right of Action and Statute of Limitations
In addition to the available common law causes of action,
such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation, the MSA gives
investors another avenue of recourse.104 The MSA makes it
unlawful for financial advisors and sellers of securities to
―make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
not misleading.‖105 It is also unlawful for a financial advisor to
104. The elements for fraud and negligent misrepresentation under
Missouri common law are essentially the same as in New York, although it
seems Missouri courts are more willing to allow claims for negligent
misrepresentation. The elements for fraud are as follows:
1) a false, material representation; 2) the speaker‘s
knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth; 3) the
speaker‘s intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer
in the manner reasonably contemplated; 4) the hearer‘s
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 5) the hearer‘s
reliance on its truth; 6) the hearer‘s right to rely thereon;
and 7) the hearer‘s consequent and proximately caused
injury.
Reding v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Mo. 2005).
The elements for negligent misrepresentation are as follows:
(1) the speaker supplied information in the course of his or
her business; (2) due to the speaker‘s failure to exercise
reasonable care, the information was false; (3) the
information was intentionally provided for the guidance of a
limited group of persons in a particular business
transaction; and (4) in justifiably relying on such
information, the listener suffered a pecuniary loss.
Gurley v. Montgomery First Nat‘l Bank, 160 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005).
105. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 409.5-501.
It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer,
sale, or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly: (1) To
employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) To make
an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, not misleading; or (3) To engage in an act, practice, or
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defraud an investor.106 The MSA affords investors a private
right of action based upon violations of the statute‘s anti-fraud
provisions.107
In the case of ARS, the most likely claim an investor would
make is that the broker made ―an untrue statement of a
material fact or . . . omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which it [was] made, not misleading.‖108
The MSA provides a liability provision, which states in part
that:
A person is liable to the purchaser if the
person sells a security . . . by means of an untrue
statement of a material fact or an omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which it is made, not
misleading . . . .109

course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon another person.
Id.
106. Id. § 409.5-502(a).
It is unlawful for a person that advises others for
compensation, either directly or indirectly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities
or that, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports relating to
securities: (1) To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud another person; or (2) To engage in an act, practice,
or course of business that operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon another person.
Id.
107. See generally id. § 409.5-509. ―The rights and remedies provided by
this act are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist, but
this act does not create a cause of action not specified in this section [409.5 –
509] or section 409.4-411(e).‖ Id. § 409.5-509(m).
108. Id. § 409.5-501.
109. Id. § 409.5-509(b).
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The purchaser, i.e., the investor, of the security has the
burden of proving that he or she ―did not know and, in the
exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of the
untruth or omission.‖110 Notably, there is no provision of the
MSA that requires the investor to prove that the seller of the
security had a culpable mental state. The statute of limitations
for violations of the MSA‘s provisions regarding material
misstatements or omissions is ―the earlier of two years after
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years
after the violation.‖111
2. Potential Remedies Under MSA
If successful, recovery may amount to:
[T]he consideration paid for the security, less the
amount of any income received on the security,
and interest at the rate of eight percent per year
from the date of the purchase, costs, and
reasonable attorneys‘ fees determined by the
court, upon the tender of the security, or for
actual damages.112
An investor who ―no longer owns the security may recover
actual damages . . . [of] the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender less the value of the security when the purchaser
disposed of it, and interest at the rate of eight percent per year
from the date of the purchase, costs, and reasonable attorneys‘
fees determined by the court.‖113
The MSA also contains a provision for rescission.114 The

110. Id.
111. Id. § 409.5-509(j)(2).
112. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(1). ―Tender requires only notice in a record of
ownership of the security and willingness to exchange the security for the
amount specified.‖ Id. § 409.5-509(b)(2).
113. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(2)-(3).
114. See generally id. § 409.5-510. Rescission is
A party‘s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally
sufficient reason, such as the other party‘s material breach,
or a judgment rescinding the contract . . . [It] is generally
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seller of the security may, prior to the purchaser filing an
action, attempt to correct any previous misstatement, or
omission, that was required to be given under the MSA.115 If
the basis for the investor‘s potential cause of action is a
misstatement or omission of a material fact, the seller may
―offer to repurchase the security for cash, payable on delivery of
the security, equal to the consideration paid, and interest at
the rate of eight percent per year from the date of the purchase,
less the amount of any income received on the security.‖116 The
seller may also ―offer to pay the purchaser upon acceptance of
the offer damages in an amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender, less the value of the security when the
purchaser disposed of it, and interest at the rate of eight
percent per year from the date of the purchase in cash‖ if the
purchaser no longer owns the underlying security.117
As evidenced by the above discussion of New York‘s Martin
Act and Missouri‘s blue sky laws, the remedies available to
investors greatly differ depending on laws of the state in which
the investor resides. An investor in one state may have a valid
and sound claim based upon one set of facts, while that same
investor with the same claim may have no recourse if he or she
resided in another state.
IV. ARS and State Securities Laws
A. Sarah, the Unsophisticated Investor
To demonstrate the devastating effects of New York‘s law
on investors, this Comment will apply both New York law and
Missouri law to a hypothetical ARS case.
Assume the
following: in 2000, Sarah inherited approximately $50,000 from
her mother‘s estate. Sarah wanted to make sure that the
available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party
and is accompanied by restitution of any partial
performance, thus restoring the parties to their
precontractual positions . . . .‖
BLACK‘S, supra note 47, at 1082.
115. § 409.5-510(1)(A).
116. Id. § 409.5-510(1)(B).
117. Id.
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money was safe, as she was planning to use it at some time in
the future as a down payment to purchase a home. She was
not investment savvy and planned on putting the $50,000 in a
savings account. A friend of hers explained that if she put the
money in a money market account, or a CD, she would be paid
a higher rate of return than she would in a standard savings
account.
Sarah entered her neighborhood brokerage firm in search
of a CD. She sat down to speak with Jack, an investment
advisor and broker. Jack asked Sarah several questions about
her investment knowledge and history in order to fill out the
customer profile sheet that all brokers must complete. Sarah
explained the circumstances to Jack: she was working a
minimum wage job, had no investment experience and wanted
to use the money as a down payment for a home, but was
unsure as to when she would be able to qualify for a mortgage.
Sarah told Jack what she knew about money markets and
how she had heard from a friend that money markets would
give her a greater return than her standard savings account
would. Jack explained to Sarah that her friend was correct,
however, he could offer her something even better! Something
that was similar to a money market, but that would make her
even more of a return. The broker told Sarah that all she
needed to do when she wanted to get her money was to call him
and he would have the money for her within seven days. Sarah
asked how that was possible, as it sounded too good to be true,
and Jack enthusiastically stated that ARS were the way to go
these days.
Sarah signed the brokerage firm contract (which of course
had a mandatory arbitration clause built into it) and purchased
$50,000 worth of ARS holdings at the suggestion of her broker,
Jack. Between 2000 and 2007, she made a great return and
was very satisfied with her investment. By the end of 2007,
Sarah finally qualified for a home mortgage. In February of
2008, she was ready to purchase her dream house. Because
she was still in a lease in her apartment, Sarah signed a
contract to sublet the apartment to a friend. The sublet period
was to begin March 1, 2008 and to last for the remainder of the
term of the lease. Sarah called Jack and told him she needed
access to her $50,000 as she was purchasing her first home the
following week.
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Jack informed Sarah that there suddenly was no market
for ARS and he would not be able to get her the $50,000. Sarah
didn‘t understand, she needed her money within the next two
weeks or else the seller of the home would put it back on the
market. Jack apologized and explained that the ARS auctions
were failing, the market was illiquid and that this was an
―unprecedented‖ event. He did, however, offer to loan Sarah
the $50,000 at an interest rate that was one and a half times
the rate of return she was collecting from the ARS. She
refused the loan.
February 2008 turned out to be a heartbreaking time for
Sarah. She was unable to purchase her dream home and had
to move out of her apartment due to the subletting contract she
had signed with her friend. Sarah had to move into a new
apartment that cost her double the rent; the old apartment
only cost $500 per month, whereas now she could not find a
new apartment for anything less than $1000 per month.
Sarah called a lawyer for legal advice on March 1, 2008.
The lawyer informed her that the market for ARS froze and her
investment was illiquid, meaning that there was no way for her
to get the $50,000 out of the market. He also told her that
there were ongoing investigations into the ARS market by the
SEC and other securities regulators. The lawyer explained to
Sarah that she had several options. First, she could hold out
until there was a successful auction. The lawyer explained
that if the market fails to become liquid, the ARS that Sarah
had invested in would not mature for another 25 years. She
could not believe this! There was no way she could wait 25
years to get her money, she needed it as soon as possible to
purchase a home. The second option was to borrow money
from Jack‘s firm using the ARS as collateral. Sarah explained
to her lawyer that Jack had already offered that possibility, but
she refused to accept the loan because she could not afford to
pay the interest rate. The lawyer then told Sarah that her
final option was to sell the security at a loss on a secondary
market (if one was available). She considered this possibility,
but of course there was no secondary market.
Sarah was not satisfied with any of the options that were
before her. The lawyer advised her to wait and see what the
outcomes of the securities regulators‘ investigations would
bring. In August 2008, she began to hear news of ARS

25

1134

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

settlements with large brokerage firms such as Citigroup and
UBS. Sarah again spoke to the lawyer, who explained to her
that the settlements at those large firms were not going to help
her. The brokerage firm that Sarah had purchased her ARS
holdings from was considered a ―downstream‖ seller and
probably would not be forced to settle via the securities
regulators.
B. What is Sarah to Do?
Sarah is not an ―eligible customer‖ under any of the
settlements the securities regulators have reached with
brokerage firms because she had purchased her ARS from a
downstream seller. As a result of her being ineligible, Sarah
does not get the benefit of FINRA‘s special arbitration
procedures for her consequential damages, i.e., the damages
she suffered by not being able to purchase a home and in turn,
being forced to pay double what she had previously paid in
rent. The only way for her to potentially recover is if she
proceeds to arbitration, which is her only available avenue per
the brokerage contract, but the defendants may contest
liability as to the illiquidity of her ARS holdings. Sarah cannot
base her arbitration claim on a violation of federal securities
laws or rules because she cannot prove that her broker
intended to misrepresent the risks associated with ARS since
even he did not know the true economics behind the ARS
markets. Sarah‘s only recourse is to file an arbitration claim
against her broker under a state securities law.
1. If the Investor is a Resident of New York?
Assume that Sarah is a resident of New York. She cannot
premise her cause of action upon the Martin Act because, as
explained above, there is no implied private right of action for
violations of the Martin Act. Now she is left only with common
law causes of action.
Should Sarah choose to base her arbitration claim upon
common law fraud, she will in all likelihood lose the case. She
can probably satisfy four of the five fraud elements: she can
show that there was a representation, that the representation
was false, that there was deception, and that she justifiably

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/10

26

2010]

BLUE SKIES AHEAD

1135

and detrimentally relied upon such false representation. The
one element that will be almost impossible for Sarah to satisfy
is scienter.
Scienter, under common law fraud in New York, is the
acting or speaking with the intent to make misrepresentations,
or reckless disregard in making it without knowledge.118 Sarah
will be hard-pressed to find any evidence that her broker, Jack,
intended to make, or with reckless disregard did make, any
misrepresentations with regard to the ARS. It is highly
possible that brokers, especially those like Sarah‘s who worked
for downstream sellers without access to the issuing firms‘
information on ARS, were not aware of the risks associated
with ARS. Sarah could perhaps prove that the broker acted
with reckless disregard by selling a security to her without full
knowledge of its risks. However, the downstream sellers and
brokers likely believed that they were knowledgeable about the
ARS market at the time they sold the securities. Historically,
ARS were good investments and a broker with a decent lawyer
could argue that the misrepresentations were not recklessly
made at the time Sarah purchased the ARS. If brokers did not
know of the risks and were not reckless when making the
misrepresentations, investors like Sarah will not satisfy the
element of scienter, which is necessary to prevail in a common
law fraud action.
Sarah may attempt to sue Jack for negligent
misrepresentation. She could possibly establish the first
element of negligent misrepresentation, that Jack was
―‗careless[ ] in imparting words upon which [she was] expected
to rely and upon which [she] did act . . . to [her] damage.‘‖119
Jack told her that ARS were just like money markets, except
that ARS would make her more of a return. Sarah also could
likely prove that Jack ―express[ed] the information ‗directly,
with knowledge or notice that it [would] be acted upon, to one
to whom the author is bound by some relation of duty. . . to act
with care if he acts at all.‘‖120 Jack did know that Sarah was
118. See GRANT, supra note 97, at 185.
119. Black & Gross, supra note 100, at 1007 n.99 (quoting White v.
Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977)).
120. Id. (quoting White, 372 N.E.2d at 319). The New York Court of
Appeals has not yet answered the question of whether an investor may claim
negligent misrepresentation when faced with a violation of the Martin Act.
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going to rely on his recommendation; she had no prior
investment experience and was, for all intents and purposes,
an entirely unsophisticated investor. Because he was Sarah‘s
broker, Jack owed her certain fiduciary duties. Although she
may be able to successfully bring a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, the trial and intermediate level courts in
New York are split as to whether investors may sue for
negligent misrepresentation based upon a violation of the
Martin Act. The New York Court of Appeals has not yet
addressed this issue, making a successful cause of action under
this theory questionable at best.
2. If the Investor is a Resident of Missouri?
Now assume that Sarah is a resident of Missouri, which
means that in arbitration, she can take advantage of the MSA.
The MSA provides for a private right of action based upon a
violation of the MSA itself; therefore Sarah need not worry that
she will not be successful based upon common law causes of
action. Under MSA Section 409.5-501, Sarah‘s strongest claim
is that her broker, Jack, made ―an untrue statement of a
material fact or omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, not misleading.‖121
Under the MSA, it is irrelevant that Jack may not have
known of all risks associated with ARS. Sarah can rely on the
MSA liability provisions that hold the seller of the security
liable for ―sell[ing] a security . . . by means of an untrue
statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of
the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading.‖122
Sarah then must satisfy the burden of proving that she ―did not
know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have
known of the untruth or omission‖ at the time she purchased
the ARS.123 Surely she could prove that she did not know that
Jack was not telling her all of the relevant facts related to ARS.

See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
121. § 409.5-501(2).
122. Id. § 409.5-509(b).
123. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/10
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Sarah knew nothing about investments of any kind. Even if
she had exercised reasonable care by conducting additional
research regarding ARS, there was no public information that
would have led Sarah to speculate that the markets were being
supported by large brokerage firms and that there was a
chance that the markets may freeze once those firms stopped
supplying supporting bids. Sarah will likely win her claim
based upon the MSA.
If Sarah is successful based upon her underlying claim, she
is entitled to receive the amount she paid for the investment—
here, $50,000—less any income she received from it.124 She
may also receive eight percent interest on the recoverable
amount and may be reimbursed for her costs and reasonable
attorneys‘ fees that she incurred as a result of pursuing her
claim.125 It is entirely possible that the broker would be willing
to offer to rescind the contract Sarah signed, meaning that the
broker would repurchase the ARS from her for the amount she
paid for it, less the income she received, plus interest of eight
percent.126
C. The Blessings of a Statutory Private Right of Action
As a result of the above hypothetical, it is evident that
Sarah would fare much better as a resident of Missouri. If she
were a resident of New York, she would likely recover nothing
in arbitration.127 The opposite is true if she were a resident of
124. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(1).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 409.5-510.
127. While there is the possibility that Sarah could prevail on a
negligent misrepresentation claim, it is unlikely that a New York court would
overturn an arbitration decision, as the grounds for doing so are limited.
1. The award shall be vacated on the application of a
party who either participated in the arbitration or was
served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the court
finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (i)
corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except
where the award was by confession; or (iii) an arbitrator, or
agency or person making the award exceeded his power or
so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (iv)
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Missouri.
There, Sarah would recover everything: her
investment (less income she received) plus interest, reasonable
attorneys‘ fees, and the possibility of rescission. The only parts
of Sarah‘s loss that may not be recoverable are her
consequential damages, e.g., her increased rent. The MSA
makes no mention of consequential damages and it is
questionable whether the arbitrator would allow Sarah to
recover those if they are not expressly allowed in the statute.
V. Conclusion
ARS are only one form of investment that took the market,
and probably the world, by surprise with their devastating
effects. In the future, there will be other securities that will do
the same. While federal and state regulatory authorities have
securities laws that they use in their attempts to remedy the
harm created by such investments, it is impossible for those
regulators to be involved every time a broker makes a
misrepresentation to an investor regarding a certain type of
investment. When regulators are not involved, investors are on
their own.
State legislatures around the country have adopted, in
some fashion, the Uniform Securities Act. This Comment
urges New York‘s legislature to do the same. For New York
investors to be at such an extreme disadvantage in a suit, or
arbitration claim, against their brokers—simply because of
their state of residence—is extremely unfair and burdensome.
Why should New York investors suffer and, in the case of ARS,
almost surely fail, in their attempts to remedy the wrongs their
brokers and brokerage firms have committed against them?
ARS may be an exaggerated example of how damaging the
effects of broker misconduct can be, but the same effects are
felt every day by New York investors who have little to no
recourse due to the State‘s legislature and its failure to provide
them with a remedy.

failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the
party applying to vacate the award continued with the
arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b) (McKinney 1998).
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The purpose of this Comment is to urge the New York
State legislature to adopt a version of the Uniform Securities
Act. The legislature could do so without hindering the power
given to the Attorney General in the Martin Act. A New York
statute that authorizes a private right of action based upon
violations of the Martin Act would grant New York investors
the many benefits that investors in almost all other states
receive.
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